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ABSTRAK 
Banyak orang sering bertanya-tanya bagaimana harga saham terbentuk di pasar. 
Volatilitas harga berdasarkan pada Wall Street Adage (kata-kata klasik yang bijak dari 
para pemain di Wall Street) adalah volume trading yang mengerakkan harga. Volume 
trading dalam kenyataannya dapat dikelompokkan ke dalam jumlah perdagangan dan rata-
rata jumlah transaksi setiap perdagangan. Penelitian ini dengan menggunakan kapitalisasi 
pasar dalam pembentukan portofolionya akan melihat manakah yang mendorong 
volatilitas harga, jumlah/banyaknya transaksi atau rata-rata besarnya volume saham per 
transaksi. Penelitian ini juga melihat jenis informasi yang mempengaruhi perusahan. 
Informasi yang bersifat umum dan informasi yang bersifat spesifik. Hasil penelitian ini 
menyimpulkan bahwa jumlah transaksi secara signifikan positip mempengaruhi volatilitas 
harga saham di Bursa Efek Jakarta. Perusahaan dengan kapitalisasi besar secara 
signifikan berhubungan dengan informasi yang bersifat umum. Untuk informasi spesifik 
secara signifikan berhubungan baik untuk perusahaan berkapitalisasi kecil maupun 
perusahaan berkapitalisasi besar.  
Kata kunci: number of trades, trade size, marketwide information, firm specific 
information, dan volatility. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
People always compare the two theory of 
price, the firm foundation theory from Eliot 
Guild who popular by John B. William and the 
technical analysis theory or by Keynes (1936) 
word is the castle in the air theory. The first 
theory believes that the greater the present 
dividends and their rate of increase, the greater 
the value of the stock. Opposite to the first 
theory, the second theory says no one knows 
for sure what will influence future earning 
prospects and dividend payments so short-run 
forecast is better than long-run forecast. Based 
on the second theory, to study the stock 
market, uses psychological principles or 
average opinion is better than financial 
evaluation. How the crowd of investors is 
likely to behave in the future is the most 
important clue to give direction on the 
volatility of the price and how during period of 
optimism they tend to build their hope into 
castles in the air (Malkiel, 1990). The 
predictability of stock market price lay down 
to the principle of “A thing is worth only what 
someone else will pay for it” (Morgenstern and 
Granger, 1970). Prices often gyrated more 
rapidly and by much greater amounts than 
could plausible be explained by apparent 
changes in their anticipated intrinsic value. The 
price rise was not due to the worth of the 
discovery to the company, but rather to the 
castle-building potential this would hold for 
prospective buyers (Malkiel, 1990: 52). 
Price describes all traders‟ expectation and 
opinion. Keynes (1936) described the playing 
of stock market with a beauty-judging contest. 
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“If you have to select the six prettiest faces out 
of a hundred photographs, with the prize going 
to the person whose selections most nearly 
conform to those of the group as a whole.” The 
smart player recognizes that personal criteria 
of beauty are irrelevant in determining the 
contest winner. A better strategy is to select 
those faces the other players are likely to 
fancy. This logic tends to snowball. After all, 
the other contestants are likely to play the 
game with at least as keen a perception. Thus, 
the optimal strategy is not to pick those faces 
the player thinks are prettiest but rather to 
predict what the average opinion is likely to be 
about what the average opinion will be or to 
proceed even further along this sequence 
(Malkiel, 1990: 31). 
The classical Wall Street adage says that to 
move prices need volume. The trading volume 
can be decomposed into two components: 
number of trades (number of transaction/ 
trading activity) and the average size of each 
trade (trade size). Earlier research focuses on 
aggregate trading volume that moves the prices 
(see among other, Pfleiderer, 1984; Foster and 
Vishwanathan, 1990; Kim and Verrecchia, 
1991; and Bessembinder and Seguin, 1992)
1
. 
Recent studies work on number of trades 
because the number of trades may convey 
more information to the market participants 
(see among other, Easley and O‟Hara, 1990; 
Harris and Raviv, 1993; Stalen, 1993; Jones et 
al., 1994; and Gopinath and Krisnamurti, 
2001). 
Based on market microstructure model 
Easley and O‟Hara (1990) find that the total 
                                                 
1
  Despite so many empirical studies on the volatility-
volume relation, there is no general consensus about 
what actually drives the relation. In particular, since 
trading volume for a time interval (e.g., daily volume) 
can be decomposed into two components, number of 
trades and average trade size, the volatility-volume 
relation could in principle be driven by either one or 
both components. The size of trades is likely to be 
positively related to the quality of information 
possessed by them and will therefore be correlated with 
price volatility.  
number of trades is informative with respect to 
price changes because the market infers 
information from both trades and a lack of 
trades. Positive relation between the number of 
trades and absolute price changes is found by 
Harris and Raviv (1993). Even traders receive 
the same information they can interpret in 
different ways. Trading occurs because of the 
divergent opinion regarding the value of the 
security generated by the same information 
(Harris and Raviv, 1993; and Shalen, 1993). 
Jones et al. (1994) conducts a research and 
finds that the number of transactions is positive 
significant to volatility of prices. Number of 
transaction or trading activity gives infor-
mation more that moves prices than trade size. 
Gopinath and Krisnamurti (2001) using high-
frequency data from NASDAQ market find 
that trading activity derive volatility of prices 
in an intraday setting. 
In line to Gopinath and Krisnamurti (2001), 
my research want to know what blinks stock 
market prices especially in Jakarta Stock 
Exchange, the number of transaction or the 
trade size and the kind of information that roles 
in determining trading frequency such as 
marketwide information and firm-specific 
information (Bessembinder et al., 1996). Not 
like Hanafi‟s (2002), my study does not 
investigate the kind of investors who posses 
better information. My research care with 
market capitalization--based on portfolios— to 
cope with the size effect.  
I find that number of transactions variables 
has a reliably positive effect on stock price 
volatility. I also find that the effect of number 
of transaction on stock price volatility 
decreases monotonically as we move from the 
smallest to the largest firm portfolios. A 
positive relation between marketwide infor-
mation and trading frequency may occur for 
large firms but the firm-specific information is 
assessable for all firms‟ size, not only for small 
firms. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 
I introduction to number of transaction and 
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trade size. Section II reviews the evident and 
behavior of number of transaction and the kind 
of information. Section III proposes metho-
dology and a simple model of trading 
frequency and the volatility. Section IV is 
empirical evidence and the last section is 
concluding remark. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Trading Volume and Volatility 
A positive relation between volume and 
volatility has documented by Gallant et al. 
(1992); Kim and Verrecchia (1991); and 
Bessembinder and Seguin (1993). Theory 
suggests that trading occurs when investors 
revise their beliefs differentially (Karpoff, 
1986). To test the relation between trading 
volume and the measure of differential 
interpretations are suggested by Kandel and 
Pearson (1995) and Bamber et al. (1999). They 
find that in the absence of price changes there 
is little reason for information-based trade 
other than differential interpretations. When 
trading volume is higher than normal, there is 
more likely to be enough liquidity trading to 
prompt informed investor to act on their 
differential interpretations.  
Trading volume can be decomposed into 
two components: number of trades and the 
average size of each trade or trade size. Size of 
trades has no information content beyond 
contained in the number of transactions (Jones 
et al., 1994). The number of trades rather than 
size may convey more information to the 
market participants since number of trades has 
a crude U-shaped pattern in the highest trading 
(Abhyankar et al., 2001). Ding (1999) with 
intraday and daily determinants of bid-ask 
spreads finds that the number of transaction is 
negatively related to bid-ask spreads, whereas 
volatility in general is positively related to it. 
Foster and Viswanathan (1993) examine the 
intraday volume pattern for top, bottom, and 
middle deciles sorted by trading activity. They 
investigate formally the relation between the 
regression coefficient of the volume regression 
and the volatility regression. For deciles one 
and ten they find a significant positive relation 
between the coefficients of the two 
regressions. 
McInish and Wood (1990) report intraday 
U-shaped patterns in volume. Volume of 
trading is a direct measure of trading activity 
and greater trading activity can lead to lower 
spreads due to economies of scale in trading 
costs. Under the premise that a portion of net 
demand in the market is related to informed 
traders, trading activity will hold some 
informational content as to the future prices. 
This endogeneity of trading to the deter-
mination of prices is the critical link between 
market activity and liquidity (Engle and Lange, 
1997). The volume of one sided trading 
necessary to push price may fluctuate from 
moment to moment, depending on the trader 
having superior information. With another 
word, information conveys the volatility of 
prices. 
Marketwide Information and Firm Specific 
Information 
Information conveys the volatility of 
prices. Information flow can be separated by 
public marketwide information and firm-
specific information (Bessembinder et al., 
1996). Trading may occur because of informed 
traders dealing with firm-specific information 
or traders transacting on the basis of 
marketwide information. Trades based on firm-
specific information are more likely to rely on 
asymmetric inside information possessed by 
certain traders. Inversely, trades induced by 
marketwide information are more likely to be 
caused by different interpretation of the same 
information. They find that trading volume of 
large stocks is more strongly related to 
marketwide information than trading volume 
of small stocks. Moreover, they find that firm-
specific information has less effect on trading 
volume of large firms than it does on trading 
volume of small firms. Their evidence shows 
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that trading volume of small firms is primary 
determined by firm-specific information. 
Tkac (1999) recommends that empirical 
research on trading volume control for market-
wide portfolio rebalancing by controlling for 
market-wide trading volume. The determinants 
of stock volatility in a setting where the rate of 
arrival of public information differs predic-
tably across stocks during the trading day. 
Differential interpretations of public infor-
mation are a significant explanatory of trading 
volume (Chan et al., 1994). 
 Barclay et al. (1990) use Saturdays on the 
Tokyo stock exchange and U.S. returns of 
Japanese dually-listed stock to investigate the 
impact of trading on volatility when public 
information arrival is reduced. If public 
information is an important determinant of 
volatility, one would expect Japanese stocks to 
experience a drop in volatility relative to 
American stocks when the Japanese business 
day ends.  
Investors trade on public information 
because new information leads them to change 
their priors. If traders have differential 
information-processing abilities, however, a 
public announcement could also increase the 
asymmetry. Public announcements will affect 
the degree of information asymmetry. Usually, 
the announcement reduces asymmetry by 
providing all traders with a common signal 
(Barclay and Dunbar, 1996). 
Investors without superior information who 
have some discretion over the timing of their 
traders will choose to move their trades to 
„normal‟ periods (unaffected by the 
announcement) to reduce the probability of 
trading with someone with superior infor-
mation. In contrast, informed traders are 
buying when the firm is undervalued and 
selling when it is overvalued. The informed 
should break up their trades and spread them 
over time in order to camouflage their trades 
with normal liquidity volume (Kyle, 1985). 
The informed would be expected to trade in 
block sizes that do not cause a significant 
deviation from the trade-size distribution of the 
normal order flow (Barclay and Warner, 1993). 
If the informed are spreading their trades 
across all trade sizes, then trading cost should 
also be affected in all trade sizes.  
In the “mixture of distributions model” 
(Epps and Epps, 1976), it is assumed that price 
variance per transaction is monotonically 
related to the volume of that transaction. A 
mixing variable, typically the number of 
information arrivals, causes the volatility-
volume relation. In the “asymmetric 
information” model (Kyle, 1985), informed 
investors submit trades based on their private 
information. When informed investors trade 
more, volatility increases because of the 
generation of private information. In the 
“differences in opinion” model (Harris and 
Raviv, 1993), when public information 
switches from favorable to unfavorable or vice 
versa, investors have different beliefs 
concerning the stock and this will generate 
trading among them. Hence, trading volume 
and absolute return are positively related 
because both are correlated with the arrival of 
public information. 
The value of private information can 
depreciate quickly. Accumulating a large 
position quickly enough may not be possible 
by trading in the small trade-size categories. If 
the value of information depreciates quickly, 
then informed traders will move to the large 
trade-size categories and trading cost will be 
affected more for large blocks than for smaller 
trades. Block trades that are large in relation to 
normal trading volume can have both 
permanent and temporary effects on the price 
of the security being traded. The larger the 
block being traded, the greater the costs 
imposed on the intermediary, and conse-
quently, the larger the required compensation. 
Block trades will have permanent price effect 
if they reveal information. If some traders have 
private information that is not fully reflected in 
the current price, the price at which the 
uninformed are willing to trade reflects both 
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the fraction of traders who are privately 
informed and the value of their private 
information (Barclay and Dunbar, 1996: 78). 
THE HYPOTHESIZED MODEL 
Gopinath and Krishnamurti (2001) and 
Jones et al. (1994) note that since greater 
number of transaction usually means higher 
volatility of prices, the number of transaction 
is likely to be related to measures of volatility 
of prices. Hence, the volume-volatility relation 
vanishes when the association between 
volatility and number of transaction is 
controlled. Given there consideration, the 
following hypothesis is expected to hold. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a direct relationship 
between number of transaction and volatility of 
prices. 
Bessembinder et al. (1996) and Barclay 
and Dunbar (1996) show that the public 
marketwide information drives the trading 
volumes of large firms. They also suggest that 
for small firms, price reaction to marketwide 
information occurs without a perceptible 
increase in trading volume. If prices can 
change even in the absence of trades for small 
firms, as market makers adjust their quotes in 
response to price changes of large firms or 
index movements. Hence, when trades of small 
firms do occur, it is mostly because trades are 
acting on the basis of firm-specific 
information. These considerations lead to the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between 
large firms and marketwide information and 
between small firms and firm-specific 
information. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Data 
The sample is drawn from 18 firms in 
manufacturing sector, which are listed in 
Jakarta Stock Exchange. To mitigate the thin 
trading problem, I screen those stocks that 
have less than an average of ten trades per day 
during the sample period of January 1999 
through December 2000 and had no dividend 
or stock split declaration dates. I delete those 
stocks that have missing daily returns during 
the sample period.  
The stocks are broken down into six 
portfolios on the basis of market capitalization 
(see Table 1). Beginning by portfolio 1, the 
smallest portfolio, follows by larger portfolio 
and portfolio 6 is the largest. Group of 
portfolio depends on the kind of industry in the 
manufacturing sector. There are three 
industries: consumption commodity, allied 
products, and natural and chemical. 
Testing of the relationship between number 
of transaction and volatility 
Following Jones et al. (1994) and Gopinath 
and Krishnamurti (2001), simple regression is 
used to estimate absolute value of closing price 
return of stock i on day t.  
Rpt = α + βNpt + εs              (1) 
Where: 
Rpt = the absolute value of closing price 
returns of stock i on day t  
Npt = number of daily transaction for 
stock i on day t.    
εs = error term 
 
Based on Jones et al. (1994), the regression 
is estimated using ordinary least squares, 
which provide consistent estimators of the 
parameters. The estimators are not efficient, 
but, as Jones et al. (1994) point out, this will 
not pose inference problem. Jones et al. 
decompose daily volume into number of trades 
and average trade size, and find that the 
number of trades appears to provide virtually 
all the explanation for the volatility-volume 
relation, with average trade size playing a 
trivial role. Their evidence suggests that trade 
size does not have any volatility impact 
beyond trading frequency. 
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Table 1. Average Market Capitalization (in Rp) of Sample 
 
No Code Name Average Market Capitalization Portfolio 
1 AISA Asia Intiselera Tbk    39,487,500,000 I smallest 
2 ERTX Eratex Djaja Limited Tbk    32,131,358,333 I 
3 INCI Intan Wijaya Chemical Industry    72,040,549,167 I 
4. SUBA Suba Indah    48,239,062,500 II 
5. PAFI Panasia Filament Inti Tbk    77,291,666,667 II 
6 LMPI Langgeng Makmur Plastic I    75,980,045,417 II 
7. KLBF Kalbe Farma  1,202,877,000,000 III 
8. ADMG GT Petrochem Industries Tbk   479,074,687,500 III 
9. DYNA Dynaplast Tbk   263,699,839,167 III 
10. TSPC Tempo Scan Pacific  1,428,843,750,000 IV 
11. MLPL Multipolar    500,963,492,500 IV 
12. ETWA Eterindo Wahanatama    514,138,287,083 IV 
13. HMSP HM Sampoerna 11,755,443,333,333 V 
14. KBLI GT Kabel Indonesia Tbk  3,112,593,166,667 V 
15. INTP Indocement Tunggal Prakasa  6,470,267,486,667 V 
16. GGRM Gudang Garam 27,194,979,621,667 VI largest 
17. AUTO Astra Otoparts Tbk  3 692,927,854,583 VI 
18. INKP Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper  9,796,133,880,417 VI 
Source: Indonesian Capital Market Directory (2001)             
Number of daily transaction 
Number of daily transaction by Jones et al. 
(1994) is calculated on the absolute of the 
return of the composite index for day t. The 
composite index on the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange is Indeks Harga Saham Gabungan 
(IHSG). Absolute value of the return of IHSG 
is necessary to make all value are positively 
counted. 
Npt = α + β Rmt  + εs              (2) 
Where: 
Npt = the number of daily transactions 
for stock i on day t 
Rmt  = the absolute value of the return of 
IHSG, composite index for day t 
εs = error term 
Rmt = 
1
1


t
tt
IHSG
IHSGIHSG
              (3) 
Where: 
Rmt = the value of the return of IHSG, 
composite index for day t 
IHSGt = Indeks Harga Saham Gabungan 
(IHSG), composite index on day t 
IHSGt-1  = Indeks Harga Saham Gabungan 
(IHSG), composite index on t-1 
 Rit = 
1
1


it
itit
P
PP
               (4) 
Where: 
Rit  = volatility of prices 
Pit   = closing price for stock i on day t 
Pit-1  = closing price for stock i on day t-1 
Portfolio return  
Portfolio returns are expected by weighted 
average of each stock return. Weighted 
average formula is necessary to impose 
different market capitalization of each industry 
that chosen for the sample.  
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Rpt = 
ctbtat
ctctbtbtatat
MCMCMC
MCRMCRMCR

 )()()(
   
       ….(5) 
Where: 
Rat = return for stock a on day t 
Rbt = return for stock b on day t 
Rct = return for stock c on day t 
MCat = market capitalization for stock a on 
day t 
MCbt = market capitalization for stock b on 
day t 
MCct = market capitalization for stock c on 
day t 
Number of transaction on portfolio 
Number of transaction/trading frequency 
on portfolio is investigated by weighted 
average of each number of transactions .  
Npt = 
ctbtat
ctctbtbtatat
MCMCMC
MCNMCNMCN

 )()()(
 
      …..(6) 
Where: 
Nat = trading frequency for stock a on day t 
Nbt = trading frequency for stock b on day t 
Nct = trading frequency for stock c on day t 
MCat = market capitalization for stock a on 
day t 
MCbt = market capitalization for stock b on 
day t 
MCct = market capitalization for stock c on 
day t 
Testing of the relationship between large 
firms and marketwide information and 
between small firms and firms-specific 
information 
Following Bessembider et al. (1996) and 
Barclay and Dunbar (1996), average number of 
transaction of firms in portfolio p on day t is 
depend on the marketwide information on day 
t and the cross-sectional average of the firm-
specific information of firms in portfolio p on 
day t. Stocks move together depends on the 
relative amounts of firm-level and marketwide 
information capitalized into stock prices (Roll, 
1988). In markets where traders have 
asymmetric information, however, both 
informed and uninformed traders must make 
strategic trading decisions. Public announ-
cements or marketwide information and firm-
specific information work together to affect 
stock prices. 
Npt = α + βFIFIpt + βMIMIt + εs                 (7) 
Where: 
Npt = average number of transactions of 
firms in portfolio p on day t  
MIt = marketwide information on day t, 
given by absolute Rmt where Rmt is 
IHSG index return (see formula 3) 
FIpt = the cross-sectional average of the 
firm-specific information of firms 
in portfolio p on day t. The firm-
specific information for firm i on 
day t is computed as absolute Rit - 
Rmt (see formula 3 and 4 to 
calculate Rmt and Rit) 
εs = error term 
EMPIRICAL RESULT 
In Table 2 I show the estimates of 
regressions of price volatility on number of 
transactions. Price volatility is measured by the 
absolute value of daily (close-to-close) return. 
Daily observations of price volatility for each 
stock within a portfolio are regressed on the 
number of daily transactions of that stock for 
that day. The regressions are performed for 
each portfolio. The results are shown in Table 
2.  
I find that number of transactions variables 
has a reliably positive effect on stock price 
volatility as shown by the t-statistics. I also 
find that the effect of number of transaction on 
stock price volatility decreases monotonically 
as we move from the smallest to the largest 
firm portfolios. My results are in conformity 
with Jones et al. (1994) and Gopinath and 
Krishnamurti (2001). 
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Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Price Volatility on Number of Transactions 
(number of transaction as independent variable) 
 
  
Port 1 
smallest 
Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5 
Port 6 
largest 
α 2.237-02 5.568-02 2.804-02 2.498-02 1.429-02 1.674-02 
β 2.239-04 5.363-05 7.115-05 3.693-05 4.649-05 2.145-05 
Adj. R
2
 0.151 0.015 0.024 0.084 0.122 0.096 
t  9.309* 2.867* 3.617* 6.743* 8.259* 7.236* 
* Significant at 5% 
I estimate the equation Rpt = α + βNpt + εs where Rpt is the absolute value of closing price returns of stock i 
on day t, and Npt is the number of daily transactions for stock i on day t.  
 
 
In Table 3, Panel A I show the estimates of 
regressions of marketwide information on 
trading frequency and Panel B of firm-specific 
information on trading frequency. 
Bessembinder et al. (1996) and Barclay and 
Dunbar (1996) characterize all information 
into two types: common or marketwide 
information and firm-specific information. 
They establish that trading may occur because 
of informed traders dealing with firm-specific 
information or traders transacting on the basis 
of marketwide information. Uninformed 
traders have incentives to maximize the 
likehood that they are trading with other 
uninformed traders. This practice can lead to 
causing alternate periods of high and low 
trading volume, especially the number of 
transaction.  
Typically, large firms have lower trading 
costs and therefore ideal candidates for such 
arbitrage trades. A positive relation between 
marketwide information and trading frequency 
may occur for large firms. Contrarily, most 
trades of small firms may be based on firm-
specific information. An implication of this 
premise is that trades of small firms contain 
more adverse information from the perspective 
of the market maker. 
In Panel A of Table 3, I use the IHSG 
index return as the proxy for marketwide 
information. The results are not all portfolios 
significant. The larger the portfolio the 
significantly the result. This confirms my 
conjecture that trades of large firms are 
significantly related to a proxy of public 
marketwide information. The evidence also 
support Bessembinder et al. (1996) and 
Barclay and Dunbar (1996) premise that for 
smaller firms there should be no meaningful 
relation between trading frequency and public 
marketwide information proxy. 
In Panel B of Table 3, I use the absolute 
value of volatility of prices subtract by the 
value of the return of IHSG, composite index, 
as describe of firm-specific information. All 
portfolios are significantly meaningful both for 
small and large firms, not like Bessembinder et 
al. (1996) and Barclay and Dunbar (1996) 
conclusions. The results indicate that firm-
specific information is assessable for all firms‟ 
size. However, the association is generally not 
statistically significant for large firm. I found 
no evidence to support the uninformed firms 
can trade on more favorable terms by getting 
firm-specific information. 
In Table 4 indicate that for largest firms, 
both firm-specific information and marketwide 
information determine the trades. Both the 
firm-specific information and marketwide 
information variables are statically significant 
in explaining the number of transactions. For 
small and medium firms, firm-specific 
information seems to be the determinant of 
trades. Except for the largest firms, 
marketwide information does not appear to 
affect the number of transaction. There are no 
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clear patterns in the smallest firm portfolio. 
For large firms, both marketwide information 
and firm-specific information are significant, 
and a high proportion of the variability in the 
number of transaction is explained by the two 
information variables.  
 
Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Price Volatility on Marketwide Information and 
Firm-Specific Information 
 
  
Port 1 
smallest 
Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5 
Port 6 
largest 
Panel A. Marketwide Information as Independent Variable 
α 9.922 78.152 115.901 186.059 195.888 358.504 
β 270.199 -902.653 1262.613 681.635 1819.399 3226.313 
Adj. R
2
 0.005 0.003 0.017 -0.001 0.024 0.025 
t  1.904 -1.555 3.026* 0.867 3.553* 3.675* 
Panel B. Firm-Specific Information as Independent Variable 
α 11.816 51.889 86.179 147.680 176.903 365.175 
β 15.472 20.257 47.846 37.911 21.257 16.878 
Adj. R
2
 0.121 0.008 0.190 0.043 0.064 0.014 
t  8.215* 2.175* 10.679* 4.759* 5.827* 2.811* 
* Significant at 5% 
In Panel A, I estimate the equation Npt = α + β Rmt  + εs where Npt is number of daily transactions for stock i 
on day t, MI is the marketwide information on day t given by absolute Rmt where Rmt is IHSG index return. 
MI = Rmt = 
1
1


t
tt
IHSG
IHSGIHSG
. In Panel B, I estimate the equation Npt = α + β FIpt + εs where Npt is number 
of daily transactions for stock i on day t, FIpt is the cross-sectional average of the firm-specific information of 
firms in portfolio p on day t. FIpt= Absolute (Rit - Rmt) 
 
Table 4. Ordinary Least Square Regression Estimates of Number of Transaction on Absolute 
Value of Marketwide Information and Firm-Specific Information (firm-specific 
information and marketwide information as independent variable) 
 
  
Port 1 
smallest 
Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5 
Port 6 
largest 
α 10.903 66.094 79.954 146.225 159.586 328.883 
βFI 15.282 23.171 46.690 37.721 19.780 14.353 
βMI 74.412 -1133.190 518.146 119.162 1435.235 2961.638 
Adj R
2
 0.120 0.013 0.191 0.041 0.078 0.035 
t FI 7.975* 2.463* 10.242* 4.674* 5.407* 2.397* 
t MI 0.548 -1.937 1.345 0.153 2.855* 3.364* 
F  33.848* 4.255* 58.018* 11.135* 21.303* 9.694* 
* Significant at 5% 
I estimate the equation Npt = α + βFIFIpt + βMIMIt + εs where Npt = average number of transactions of firms 
in portfolio p on day t. MIt is marketwide information on day t, given by absolute Rmt where Rmt is IHSG 
index return, FIp is the cross-sectional average of the firm-specific information of firms in portfolio p on 
day t. The firm-specific information for firm i on day t is computed as absolute Rit - Rmt (see formula 3 and 
4 to calculate Rmt and Rit). 
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CONCLUDING REMARK 
I examined that the number of transaction 
variables has positive significant effect on 
stock price volatility. My finding supports the 
recent studies that work on number of trades 
(see among other, Easley and O‟Hara, 1990; 
Harris and Raviv, 1993; Stalen, 1993; Jones et 
al., 1994; and Gopinath and Krisnamurti, 
2001). The number of trades may convey more 
information to the market participants.  
The trades of large firms are significantly 
related to a proxy of public marketwide 
information. I confirm the positive significant 
relation between firm-specific information for 
both large and small firms. I found no evidence 
to support the uninformed firms can trade on 
more favorable terms by getting firm-specific 
information. My result is not in the same track 
to the Bessembinder et al. (1996) and Barclay 
and Dunbar (1996). The explanation for this 
result connect to the thin market on the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange incorporate income shifting 
may make firm-specific information less useful 
to the risk arbitrageurs and therefore impede its 
capitalization into stock prices (Morck et al., 
1999).  
Although there are many empirical studies 
on volatility-volume relation, there is still no 
general consensus about what actually drives 
the relation. Despite Jones et al. (1994) and 
Gopinath and Krisnamurti (2001) findings who 
investigate how daily price volatility could be 
explained by daily number of trades more than 
trade size, Chan and Fong (1999) does not 
agree to them. Chan and Fong (1999) say, it is 
premature to conclude that trade size has no 
information content beyond that contained in 
the number of trades because: (1) with relaxing 
a monotonic relation between volatility and 
trade size, the number of transaction does not 
have superior impact to the volatility; (2) if the 
test does not ignore an important prediction of 
the market microstructure model so trade size 
will play not a trivial role; and (3) different 
result depend on the participants in the market, 
such as analyst, institutional investors, and 
insiders. 
Further researches can be conveyed by 
investigate: (1) the types of informed and 
uninformed market participants, such as 
analysts, institutional investors, and insiders; 
(2) who possesses the funds, individual or 
institutions; (3) domestic or foreign traders; (4) 
bid-ask spreads of intraday pattern and cost 
trading; (5) trading and nontrading hour 
activity (pre trading, post trading) information; 
and (6) anomaly and normal period. Some 
models can be proposed as “mixture of 
distributions model” by Epps and Epps (1976), 
asymmetric information model by Kyle 
(1985), differences in opinion model by Harris 
and Raviv (1993), and time varying liquidity 
by Engle and Lange (1997).  
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